In quantum information, the role of entanglement and disentanglement is itself a subject of research and debate. Earlier works on quantum cryptography have almost established that entanglement has no special advantage in quantum cryptography. In this paper we reveal that entanglement is better ingredient than disentanglement for our alternative quantum cryptography.
In quantum information, there are some tasks which can be accomplished only by entanglement -such as dense coding [1] and teleportation [2] . But, there are some other tasks which can be realized both by entanglement and disentanglement. Quantum computation algorithm [3] and quantum cryptography [3] [4] [5] are two major applications of both entanglement and disentanglement.
Between entanglement and disentanglement which one is better ingredient in quantum computation and quantum cryptography ? This question is yet not settled in quantum computation, however, entanglement enjoys some favoritism from the researchers in this field. In quantum cryptography this question is believed to have been settled. In his entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol [5] Ekert pointed out that quantum encryption can be executed after the transmission of the quantum state. This seemed to be advantageous to ensure the security of the key. Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [6] comparatively studied Ekert's entanglement-based and Bennett-Brassard's disentanglementbased quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. They concluded that so far security is concerned, the operational advantage of Ekert's protocol is apparent. Since then, many quantum cryptographic protocols have been proposed and both type of cryptosystems have been extensively studied. But neither of the two type of systems can stake claim of its superiority.
In their comparative study [6] , Bennett et al made an another important observation. They found that entanglement and disentanglement based cryptosystem are indistinguishable. That is, which type is being used cannot be distinguished by others. If sender uses entangled state but tells dishonestly to the receiver that he used disentangled state for the encryption, then receiver could not also verify the veracity of sender's statement. In that sense, two cryptosystems are indistinguishable. It is recently understood conventional quantum bit commitment protocol ( a cryptographic application) completely fails [7, 8] because of this indistin-guishability of two systems. Therefore, Bennett et al's work has become helpful to examine other cryptographic tasks. Their work was based on conventional cryptography. Recently alternative disentanglement and entanglement based cryptographic protocols have been proposed [9, 10] . Many conclusions drawn from conventional quantum cryptography do not hold good in alternative quantum cryptography. So a fresh comparative study is necessary.
Alternative disentanglement-based cryptosystem [9] uses mixed quantum state to encode a bit value but alternative entanglement based system [10] uses many pure entangled states for the same purpose. Despite this dissimilarity, they have many similarities. Both can operate entirely on quantum channel and can provide quantum authentication. In both the systems, key can carry meaningful information. Secure bit commitment encoding [11] and secure quantum coin tossing [11] are possible for both the systems.
Yet the two systems are not well understood. We have seen that classical channel cannot be used in disentanglement-based system when each individual bit is separately made secure, but we do not know whether same is true for our entanglement-based system. We also do not know whether conventional cryptography or its prototype can be recovered from these alternative systems or not. Here we shall see that on these two questions two cryptosystems differ.
First, we shall present a modified (alternative) entanglement-based QKD protocol in which classical channel can be used when each bit is separately made secure and a prototype of conventional QKD protocol can be recovered from this protocol. This kind of modification is not possible for our disentanglement based system. This will imply that our entanglement-based system can be made much much faster than our disentanglement-based system. Suppose a source emits pairs of spin 1/2 particle in their singlet state. Let us assume they jointly decide the bit values. The bit values can be decided when both of them use the same sequence of measurements. To produce a key, both use S 0 and S 1 at random on their own sequences of EPR particles. When both use S 0 or S 1 , the corresponding results will be perfectly correlated. But if one use S 0 and other S 1 or vice versa, the results will not be perfectly correlated. So 50% bit value choices are discarded. The remaining 50% bits form the key. We shall first assume they reveal results through classical public channel.
Their measurements yield the two sequences of data sets: Eavesdropper's problem is to know the secret code of measurements. For simplicity, let us think they want to produce a single bit and only Bob's particles are exposed to Eve. Eve can directly or indirectly measure using her own sequence of measurements. She gets a set of data from her measurements and taps Alice's set of data when Alice reveals the results. But these two sets of data will neither reveal any bit information nor complete information of Alice's choice of measurements. Now it is Eve's turn to reveal the results. Alice's and Eve's results cannot be perfectly correlated. But this can be interpreted by Alice as a case of non-identical choice of bit values. Note that in S 0 and S 1 there is a common subsequence S c . So if Alice does not get perfect correlation, she can check the data corresponding to S c . Irrespective of choice of sequences of measurements, the data corresponding to S c will be always perfectly correlated. This second test will expose eavesdropping. Still it is not the last nail to eavesdropping.
The data are not secure because public channel is not authenticated channel. Eve can impersonate. After Alice's disclosure of data, Eve, impersonating Bob, can reveal "fake data" correlating with Alice's data. Same thing she can do with Bob's data impersonating Alice. Note that this attack works only for "fake correlation". That is, this attack will work when the users choose the same bit value. But they also choose different bit values in 50% cases. In those cases, data are not perfectly correlated, only the data corresponding to S c are perfectly correlated. So initially if they do not get perfect correlation between their data sets, they will get perfect correlation in the subsets. As S c is hidden in S 0 and S 1 , Eve could not generate "fake correlation" in the data corresponding to the subset S c . Therefore Eve can only impersonate to select the bits not to reject the bits. Eve can leave the task of rejecting the bits for the legitimate users. It seems that system fails.
There is a rescue. The "fake correlation" attack works as both of them reveal all the data of the same events. The "fake correlation" cannot be produced if they do not reveal any data. But the data has to be revealed if the system is to run. If they do not reveal all the results of the same events, yet the system can work but "fake correlation" attack cannot. For clarity, suppose they divide the results of each set into two subsets. Alice's subsets are r . Because, the data of two correlated subsets are not revealed, "fake correlation" attack will not work.
To create many bits, the strategy, discussed above, has to be repeatedly used to ensure bit by bit security. If any bit is found corrupted, the next bit will not be produced. If eavesdropping is detected they must reject S 0 and S 1 and may try with another two preselected sequences of measurements.
Is it possible to recover existing quantum cryptography from alternative quantum cryptography and vice versa ? Let us see the basic difference of the conventional and alternative systems. In conventional quantum cryptography, a pure state or a pure entangled state represent a classical bit/bits. On the other hand in alternative quantum cryptography, many states represent a classical bit. The bits of the conventional cryptosystem do not carry meaningful information but it carries meaningful information in alternative cryptosystem. Therefore recovery of alternative system from conventional system is not possible. But if we can produce pure state -bits (which does not carry any meaningful information) from alternative system then at least recovery of prototype of conventional system, if not the same system, will be possible. We have two options -recovery of conventional entanglement-based system from alternative entanglement based system and conventional disentanglementbased system from alternative disentanglement-based system. Next we shall see that the former can be easily realized.
We have seen that when both of them use S 0 or S 1 , the data are perfectly correlated. These two sets of data can make a key provided they are not revealed. Suppose Alice divides the results into three subsets r contain perfectly correlated data. To construct r 3 , it is better to use the data corresponding to S c so that they always get perfectly correlated data even when they use non-identical sequences of measurements. Continuing the process two different kind of keys (fast and slow keys) can be produced. The former does not exist even in the mind of the users and the later can exist in the mind of the users. If they want to produce only the former type they can share only a single sequence of measurement instead of the two.
The recovery of conventional entanglement-based system from alternative entanglement-based system is not possible. The reason is, a sequence of single photon polarized states produces sequence of results. These results can represent bit value. But if these results are revealed they cannot be secure.
Why do these systems differ on the above two issues ? From a sequence of two-particle entangled state Alice and Bob can get correlated random bits. And some of the correlated data are used for authentication via public channel and rest of the correlated data itself can make a fast key (which is a recovery of a prototype of conventional QKD protocol). Measurements on a sequence of disentangled states never produce correlated data. Therefore, entanglement is a necessary condition to have the above mentioned two utilities. As we get fast key from entanglement based system, entanglement is better secure number generator than disentanglement in our case.
Throughout our discussion we relied on bit by bit security. If we do not want bit by bit security but want security of many bits (meaningful) at a time, then such security needs to be proved. In that scenario there may have a possibility of using authenticated classical channel (authentication by some additional shared classical bits) in our disentanglementbased system. In that eventuality, we can say the use of classical channel and bit by bit security are mutually exclusive in our disentanglementbased system.
